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One might summarize the state of the field of research into contemporary Russian politics
as a “dismal consensus”: most observers believe that durable authoritarianism has
consolidated itself, and there is very little chance of democratization in the foreseeable
future. Many barriers to democratization, such as an unfavorable international
environment and the persistence of non-democratic legacies, as well as the entrenchment
of the state’s use of coercion and repressions, seem insuperable in the short term.
However, political regime changes are often launched and develop over time as side
effects of moves made by political actors, and their outcomes are not predetermined. This
article aims to go beyond this “dismal consensus,” and revisits some of the arguments on
the role of structure and agency in post-Soviet regime dynamics. Apart from the changes
in structural variables, it reconsiders the role of the incentives and choices of self-
interested political actors, who are not always omnipotent and well-informed strategists.
The overall dismal tendencies nevertheless leave some “bias for hope” in the analysis of
regime dynamics in post-Soviet Eurasia and beyond.
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Introduction: beyond the dismal consensus
In all likelihood, the early 1990s were the happiest time in history for scholars of democracy. The fall of
the Berlin Wall and the subsequent collapse of communism had seemingly paved the way to the global
triumph of democracy, and the overall political trajectory was perceived to be heading toward the “end
of history” (Fukuyama 1992), the outcome of the Manichean conflict between good and evil. Dozens of
books and hundreds of articles with very promising titles such as “From Communism to Democracy”
reflected the widespread optimism about the future of democracy and positive perceptions of political
dynamics in Europe, Eurasia, and elsewhere. In a way, this understanding was similar to the scenarios of
many Hollywood movies, which are usually based on similar kinds of conflict between “good guys” and
“bad guys,” with the expectation that the “good guys” will inevitably prevail and give the film a happy
end. In practice, real life is much more complex than Hollywood movies, and political life is no
exception. The times of Great Expectations of the early 1990s turned into the times of Great
Disillusionment of the late 2010s. In sharp contrast with the rising optimism of the early 1990s, many (if
not most) scholars, observers, and analysts now tend to perceive recent political developments in the
post-communist world and beyond as virtually hopeless. In cinematographic terms, one might compare
this to a shift from the Hollywood movie paradigm of political thought to the predominance of film noir
thinking about politics. It is based upon a belief that there is no such thing as “good guys,” all “guys” are
exclusively bad, and the overall perceptions of global political dynamics today and tomorrow are
essentially dismal. On the one hand, democratic ideals have recently been questioned if not discredited
due to the rise of new challenges for advanced democracies and the imperfect responses of democratic
governments amid the global trend of new populism, and the discreet charm of authoritarian rule has re-
invented itself across the world (very often under the primitive logic of “the enemy of my enemy is my
friend”). On the other, some authoritarian regimes have proved resilient enough to ensure their survival,
while both old and new democracies in many parts of the globe (and not only in post-Soviet Eurasia)
have demonstrated numerous problems with their economic and political performance. The partial
restoration of the real or imagined “good old” non-democratic political order is now often considered as
a viable alternative to the unpalatable status quo.
It is no wonder that these political tendencies have greatly contributed to the current state of the art in
research of political regime dynamics in post-Soviet Eurasia: in essence, it may be labeled a “dismal
consensus.” Deriving from the fact that none of the 12 countries of the former Soviet Union (except for
the Baltic states) have built a stable electoral democracy after a quarter century of independence, scholars
with a variety of views and approaches do not expect further democratic advancement for these countries
at least in the foreseeable future. As for Russia, it is almost universally perceived as a case of durable
authoritarianism, and the title of the recent book Will Putin’s System Survive until 2042? (Travin 2016)
may summarize the mainstream perceptions of this country’s political future. At best, scholars express
some hope for the long-term effects of economic growth, which, alongside generational changes, may
lay down favorable conditions for democratization in Russia some decades from now (Hale 2015;
Treisman 2015). Although economic experts express skeptical opinions about Russia’s prospects for
sustainable growth and development amid turbulent oil prices and international sanctions (World Bank
2017), even the political scientists’ cautiously positive outlook reminds one of a statement by the
nineteenth-century Russian poet Nikolai Nekrasov, who predicted the bright yet very distant future of
Russia in his The Railway (1864): “Alas! That the day of our joyful tomorrow // I shall not witness—and
neither shall you.”
However, the rise of the dismal consensus over the political prospects of Russia and Eurasia only to some
degree reflects the pattern of ongoing political changes. It also demonstrates the shift of scholarly focus
from agency-driven to structure-induced explanations of political changes in post-Soviet Eurasia and
beyond. The research into the Third Wave of democratization in the 1980s primarily concentrated on the
key role of agency in the demise of authoritarian regimes in Latin America and Eastern Europe
(O’Donnell, Schmitter, and Whitehead 1986; Huntington, 1991; Przeworski, 1991) through the lenses of
analyses of conflicts and coalitions of political actors during the process of political regime changes.
Conversely, major explanations of the rise of new post-communist authoritarianism are predominantly
structural and refer to a variety of non-economic factors. Their list ranges from the persistence of legacies
of bad informality (“sistema”) (Ledeneva 2013) and of “patronal politics,” which tend to reproduce
“single power pyramids” in the region over time (Hale 2015), to the impact of the strength of the state
and/or ruling parties and weakness of international linkages between these countries and Western
democracies (Levitsky and Way 2010). While actor-based perspectives on post-Soviet authoritarianism
have not disappeared entirely, they largely attempt to explain these political developments through the
personal traits of Vladimir Putin and other post-Soviet leaders, whom they portray as “bad guys” who
have seized and usurped power by chance, impose their kleptocratic rule in their respective countries,
and export it abroad (Hill and Gaddy 2013; Dawisha 2014; Cooley and Heathershaw 2017). Although
many of these negative assessments of post-Soviet leaders appear accurate in factual terms, they are
insufficient for theoretically solid analyses of causes and effects of the new post-Soviet authoritarianism.
This pendulum-like swing from agency to structure in the research on post-Soviet political regime
dynamics seems paradoxical in two respects. First, the experience of post-Soviet Eurasia is contrary to
conventional wisdom on the key role of major economic structural variables in the dynamics of political
changes in comparative perspective. For example, economic development in Russia coincided with the
process of its regime changes according to the pattern of “more development—less democracy” (Colton
2017), contrary to the predominant explanations of the “prerequisites” of democracy in the literature
(Lipset 1959). In a similar vein, the degree of socio-economic inequality in the region, while having
increased after the Soviet collapse, is still lower than in many Latin American democracies (Remington
2011), so one should not claim the rise of inequality in post-Soviet Russia (Novokmet, Piketty, and
Zucman 2017) to be the main cause for its non-democratic trajectory. Even the inclusion of additional
economic structural variables such as the pernicious political effects of the “resource curse” (Ross 2012)
has not added much to this picture in oil-rich countries such as Russia (Treisman 2011). Judging by all
economic structural variables, one might expect that Russia and Eurasia should be more politically open
than they are evaluated to be by various agencies. Thus, it is not so clear why some (non-economic)
structural explanations of post-Soviet durable authoritarianism are effective while others (economic) are
not. Second, one might be puzzled by a certain theoretical inconsistency. Why has the collapse of Soviet
communism been rather successfully explained through the prism of numerous actor-based analyses
(Solnick 1998; Kotkin 2001; McFaul 2001), similarly to those of some other authoritarian regimes
(Przeworski 1991), while the understanding of causes and mechanisms of the new post-Soviet
authoritarianism is concentrated solely on structural factors and constraints? In a broader sense, the
reliance upon structure-driven approaches tends to explain continuity rather than change, and this state
of the field may reflect the existing dismal consensus among scholars instead of setting a new research
agenda.
The task of this article is twofold. It aims to refocus the analysis of post-Soviet regime dynamics and add
an agency-driven perspective in explaining the logic of political trajectories. This will also allow
scholarship to move beyond the dismal consensus on Russia and reconsider the sources and mechanisms
of political changes in a more systematic way. This is why I will propose different models of political
regime dynamics in post-authoritarian settings and then discuss the effects of changes in structural
variables, and of the unintended consequences of the incentives and choices of self-interested political
actors, who are not omnipotent and well-informed strategists. The limited predictive capacity of both
political  actors and political  analysts leaves some “bias for hope” in the analysis of regime dynamics,
thus challenging the dismal consensus as a way of thinking in post-Soviet Eurasia and beyond.
Two political models: “Lord of the Flies” versus “pluralism by default”
Perhaps the best-ever description of post-Soviet regime dynamics in Russia was published as early as
1954—not in political science, but in fiction. Nobel Prize winner William Golding’s Lord of the Flies is
worth reading as a classic example of authoritarian regime-building on an uninhabited island by a
community of teenagers.1 According to Golding’s plot, political regime dynamics on this island
underwent the following stages: (1) a failed attempt to build an electoral democracy; (2) failed informal
power-sharing between the most influential actors (an oligarchy); (3) seizure of power by the most brazen
teenager, who excluded his rivals from the community, reshuffled the “winning coalition” of followers
(Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2011), and established (4) a repressive tyranny, which resulted in a new
catastrophe. In the novel, the encroachment of external actors (namely, navy officers) put an end to these
dynamics, but in real life, the catastrophe could continue virtually forever. One should admit, however,
that Golding’s characters were not doomed to tyranny because of unfavorable structural factors: they
were just ordinary teenagers, left to their own devices. The major lesson of Lord of the Flies for political
scientists  is  that  authoritarianism  is  a  natural  logical  outcome  of  the  power  maximization  drive  of
successful brazen politicians who face insufficient constraints to their aspirations. These constraints may
fail to be imposed by other politicians (who may be less impertinent and/or less lucky than their rivals),
or by society at large (which may agree that “any order is better than any disorder” [Przeworski 1991,
86] and accept an authoritarian status quo), and/or by external actors (largely absent in the novel’s pages
until the very end). Such a trajectory of political evolution manifested in the case of post-Soviet Russia
and a number of other countries.
In reality, democratization is not a direct consequence of any “prerequisites,” but also a result of causal
mechanisms, such as elite conflicts, which cannot be resolved as zero-sum games, or bottom-up pressures
from mass social movements on the political class, or the external influence of developed democracies.
In post-Soviet Russia, however, none of these mechanisms was at work. All elite conflicts were resolved
in a zero-sum manner: the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the elimination of the Congress of
People’s Deputies in 1993, Boris Yel’tsin’s presidential reelection in 1996, and the struggle for Yel’tsin’s
succession in 1999–2000 (Gel’man 2015). Mass political participation, effectively mobilized during the
times of perestroika, was tamed and/or had a limited impact after the Soviet collapse (Robertson 2011;
Greene 2014): even some visible episodes of public discontent such as the 2011–2012 wave of mass
protests did not significantly change this picture. At the same time, foreign political influence on Russian
domestic politics remained weak during the entire post-Soviet period. Unsurprisingly, under these
conditions, Russia’s rulers were left to their own devices, similar to Golding’s teenagers, and thus the
trajectory of Russia’s political regime demonstrated similar dynamics. The failure of electoral democracy
and the rise of oligarchs in the 1990s turned into seizure of power and exclusion of the regime’s rivals in
the 2000s, and contributed to the consolidation of a personalist authoritarian regime in the 2010s, which
tended to rely more systematically upon selective repressions as a tool of political control for the sake of
power preservation (Gel’man 2016). At all critical junctures of post-Soviet political development in
Russia when politicians had to choose between democratization (in other words, power shifting by
electoral means) and preserving power in their own hands, the rejection of democracy became a natural
logical move for ruthless self-interested rulers who met insufficient resistance to their aspirations (at
least, at the time). One might argue that the rise of post-Soviet authoritarianism in Russia emerged as a
side effect of the failure of its democratization after the collapse of communism. Still, the pattern of Lord
of the Flies—a unilateral zero-sum seizure of power by the strongest actors—also prevailed in the cases
of political regime trajectories in other post-Soviet countries, ranging from Belarus (Way 2015) to
Uzbekistan (Jones Luong 2002), even though their post-Soviet critical junctures were less numerous or
did not happen at all. Regardless of these variations, the “Lord of the Flies” model results in a non-
democratic equilibrium: once established, it may reproduce over time even despite political leadership
changes, as the experience of Turkmenistan and, more recently, of Uzbekistan suggests.
The only alternative to the “Lord of the Flies” model of post-Soviet authoritarian regime building that
emerged in post-Soviet Eurasia has been described by Lucan Way as “pluralism by default” (Way 2015).
If elite fragmentation is sufficient that one cannot seize power unilaterally, then this fragmented
arrangement of actors may prevent power monopolization or, at minimum, impose major barriers to such
an outcome of conflicts. Against the background of a fragile stalemate in intra-elite struggles and
numerous reshufflings of ad hoc coalitions of oligarchs and local leaders, competing elite segments are
forced to use the tool of mass mobilization domestically and appeal for support from foreign actors (both
pro-democratic and anti-democratic) internationally. These political dynamics were typical for Ukraine
and Moldova after the Soviet collapse.2 After a series of conflicts and periods of turbulence, in the 2010s
these countries became electoral democracies, but not because of a conscious choice by elites and masses
alike. Rather, democratic outcomes occurred in these cases because those seeking to become dominant
actors (as per the “Lord of the Flies” model) were unable to seize and monopolize power, and their
attempts to use violence against fellow citizens (as Viktor Yanukovych attempted to do in 2014) resulted
in  loss  of  power.  At  least,  the  chances  of  the  rise  of  personalist  autocracies  similar  to  Russia  or
Kazakhstan look slim at the moment both in Ukraine and in Moldova, and the institutional empowerment
of their legislatures and governments relative to presidents (Hale 2015) has diminished these chances. It
is too early to speculate to what extent the continuity of “pluralism by default” over time may turn into
a democratic equilibrium of institutionalized competitive politics—at best, the “pluralism by default”
model could be described as a “democratic situation” (Collier and Levitsky 1997, 446), but it is hard to
judge risks of further disequilibrium.
In essence, the patterns of elite conflicts (zero-sum versus non–zero-sum) make for a major (if not the
only) source of difference between the “Lord of the Flies” and “pluralism by default” models of political
regime dynamics. As Mancur Olson stated, “Autocracy is prevented and democracy is permitted by the
accidents of history that leave a balance of power or stalemate—a dispersion of force and resources that
makes it impossible for any one leader or group to overpower all of the others” (Olson 1993, 573).
Arrangements of domestic elites served as the key actor-driven variable, while both mass actors and
international pro-democratic and anti-democratic “leverages” (Levitsky and Way 2010) played at best a
secondary role in determining these outcomes. The impact of mass political participation in building
barriers against possible seizure and monopolization of political power may be considered a side effect
of intra-elite struggles. Moreover, as Graeme Robertson convincingly explained in his analysis of labor
protests in Russia in the 1990s, mass unrest served to provide bargaining chips for resolving intra-elite
conflicts between national and subnational leaders, and their elite-driven mobilization or demobilization
was largely instrumental (Robertson 2011). In a similar way, Scott Radnitz also portrayed certain
episodes of political mobilization in Central Asia as “weapons of the wealthy” (Radnitz 2012): the impact
of mass politics is complementary but not substitutive to non–zero-sum elite conflicts. The same might
be true for analysis of the democratizing effects of international influence vis-à-vis domestic political
struggles: the reliance of domestic political actors upon the support of Western democratizers (as well as
upon the support of anti-democratic “black knights”) is largely instrumental and can strengthen (or
weaken) domestic political competition but cannot impose (or eliminate) it from outside.
To put it bluntly, the political regime dynamics in the entire region of post-Soviet Eurasia over the last
quarter century fit one or the other of these two types of political trajectories—“Lord of the Flies” or
“pluralism by default”—although some cases, such as those of Georgia or Armenia (Derluguian 2017),
have demonstrated inconsistent oscillations between them. In this respect, one should admit that the
“pluralism by default” model is by no means affected by socio-economic structural factors to a greater
degree than that of “Lord of the Flies.” The same gap can be observed with regard to their effects:
economic growth and development in Ukraine as well as its quality of governance are at least no better
(if not worse) than those in Russia. In a sense, these trends challenge the conventional argument about
the key role of socio-economic development as a necessary, if not sufficient, factor of democratization
(as in the classical version of the structural approach).
Shifting the lenses of scholarly analysis of post-Soviet political regime dynamics back from structure to
agency may lead to similar conclusions to previous agency-driven accounts of regime changes, those
made during the “third wave” of democratization (Huntington 1991). As Adam Przeworski considered
“democracy as a contingent outcome of conflicts” (Przeworski 1988, 59), one can treat the rise of
authoritarianism in post-Soviet Eurasia and beyond as a contingent outcome of intra-elite conflicts as
well. In many ways, post-Soviet non-democratic countries were (and still are) not doomed to establish
personalist authoritarian regimes once and forever, even though the chances of their democratization
currently look unpromising, to put it mildly. However, this shift of lenses is important not only in political
but also in scholarly terms.
How and why actors matter
The current dismal consensus among scholars over prospects for democracy and democratization in the
world (and especially in post-Soviet Eurasia) is not entirely new. To a large degree, it looks like a replica
of the dismal consensus of the 1970s. This was the time when the negative consequences of the Vietnam
War and Watergate were considered major threats to the Western world much more than Brexit and
Trump are today, when the dead end of stagflation was perceived as a predictor of the coming decline if
not complete collapse of capitalism, and when almost nobody believed that communism would end
relatively soon. Quite the opposite, the gloom over the very possibility of democratization of
authoritarian regimes was much deeper than today—the prospect was called into question, if not
completely denied (Huntington 1984). During these years, major scholars published alarmist reports
about the irresolvable global crisis of democracy, and structural determinism dominated in skeptical
accounts of the future of political freedoms in developing countries (Crozier, Huntington, and Watanuki
1975)—all things that sound much too familiar to present-day observers. At the same time, long-standing
authoritarian regimes coming to an end in Portugal and Spain, and the subsequent major collapse of non-
democracies in Latin America and, later on, in Eastern Europe during the next decade could hardly have
been predicted. This was also the time when the most influential actor-centered research project was
launched in 1979 under the auspices of the Woodrow Wilson Center, and in seven years, it culminated
in the oft-cited four-volume set, Transitions from Authoritarian Rule (O’Donnell, Schmitter, and
Whitehead 1986).
Many years later, Guillermo O’Donnell recalled the scholarly point of departure of the “Transitions”
project as the following:
… we found this [structural—V.G.] perspective rather dismal, so we thought to emphasize
political factors, purposive political actions, and show how politics could counteract or
activate these slowly moving structural factors. We also had the notion … that the impact
of structural variables on behavior is not a constraint but itself is variable. (Munck and
Snyder 2007, 292)
[no new paragraph]This argument is worth reconsidering in light of recent political regime dynamics
across the globe, including post-Soviet Eurasia. Even though the scholars of the “Transitions” project
were pro-democratic sympathizers and their refocusing on the key role of agency was driven by a
disagreement with the structure-induced notion of a durable authoritarian status quo, they did not deny
the structural perspective as such but reformulated the impact of structural factors.3 The actor-based
perspective added a necessary dynamic dimension to the largely static picture of political regimes, which
at that time was merely perceived as a projection of economic development, social structure, and/or
cultural traits. Although the “Transitions” project developed a “dynamic model” (Rustow 1970) of
regime changes occurring in a democratic direction, the framework for analysis was one that had been
proposed a little earlier for another large-scale project studying democratic breakdowns (Linz and Stepan
1978), based on somewhat similar conceptual and methodological principles. To summarize, agency-
driven analyses with their emphasis on micro-level moves of political actors, often formalized through
the prism of a rational choice approach and game-theoretical models (Przeworski 1991; Colomer 2000),
offered a welcome complementarity rather than substitution for macro-level structural explanations
(Mahoney and Snyder 1999).
These lessons from the dismal consensus of the 1970s and how it was overcome over the next decade—
both in political and in scholarly terms—may be useful for reassessment of the current state of the field
in research on post-Soviet regime dynamics and its further prospects. It is an important exercise given
the recent boom in studies of Russian politics in the United States (Frye 2017), which is driven not only
by ongoing tensions in US-Russian relations4 but also by the increasing interest of political scientists in
comparative studies of authoritarianism (Gandhi 2008; Levitsky and Way 2010; Bueno de Mesquita and
Smith 2011; Svolik 2012). Still, the dismal consensus in research on post-Soviet Eurasia is reproduced
over and over again, in part because of the echo-chamber effect among analysts of contemporary politics,
who tend to reinforce each other’s frustrations and biases beyond the needs of the field. Meanwhile, the
need for a new “dynamic model” of post-Soviet political regimes instead of the present-day dismal
consensus is vitally important for further development of a research agenda and may have implications
beyond the region of Eurasia.
Following O’Donnell’s comments on the impact of structural variables (economic and non-economic
alike) on political regime dynamics, it is possible to revisit not only scholarship’s understanding of them
but the basic list itself. These variables should be considered as ever-changing environmental conditions
of political regime dynamics, which may evolve over time in different directions because of the effects
of many other variables. In particular, several non-economic structural factors of political regime
dynamics, such as the use of coercive power by states, mobilization of identity divisions (or lack thereof),
and the effects of various “legacies of the past” may be not only be considered causes of the diversity of
trajectories of political regimes (Hale 2015; Way 2015), but also perceived as effects of strategic moves
taken by political actors.
State  coercion  as  a  repressive  instrument  of  political  regimes  (Davenport  1995)  is  essential  for  the
survival of autocracies, and this is why this perspective of analysis of post-Soviet state-building is very
important for an understanding of the successes and failures of authoritarianism (Levitsky and Way 2010;
Way 2015). Still, the question is to what extent various outcomes of repressive policies were determined
by structural causes or, rather, to what extent they were driven by the efforts of post-Soviet political
leaders. While almost all of them invested certain efforts in the building of hierarchical “power pyramids”
(Hale 2015) within the state apparatus, known in Russian political jargon as the “power vertical,” their
effects were different despite certain similarities among their Soviet-era building blocks. In Belarus,
Alexander Lukashenko effectively developed “preemptive” authoritarianism (Silitski 2005) despite a
lack of structural prerequisites. His regime systematically exploited the state’s control over the economy,
and combined comprehensive top-down control and monitoring of all activities with an open border and
strong incentives for emigration by real and/or potential dissenters (Way 2015; Gel’man 2016), thus
preventing any serious risks of mass protests. In Russia, Putin during his first two presidential terms very
successfully pursued the recentralization of the state after its deep and protracted decentralization. He
was able to reintegrate subnational “political machines” into a nationwide vote delivery reserve force
through effective institution-building (Reuter 2017) and offering a winning combination of sticks and
carrots to the subnational layers of the “power vertical” (Gel’man and Ryzhenkov 2011). Thus, the
Kremlin provided sufficiently strong incentives for the political loyalty of its subordinates and extended
it  from  the  level  of  regions  and  cities  (Reuter  and  Robertson  2012)  to  the  level  of  enterprises  (Frye,
Reuter, and Szakonyi 2014). In the end, Russia’s regime successfully coped with the unexpected wave
of mass protests in 2011–2012 (Gel’man 2015) and further tightened the screws of repressive policies.
By contrast, during his reign Ukrainian president Yanukovych completely failed to build a power vertical
before the Euromaidan protests (Kudelia 2014). Instead of investing in authoritarian institution-building
and turning the coercive apparatus into an effective instrument of control over the state machinery,
Yanukovych staffed subnational executive offices with his personal loyalists, thus increasing the
alienation of many local leaders and oligarchs. The latter, having retained relative political and economic
autonomy, later betrayed the autocrat after his fall (other than in Yanukovych’s own solid power base in
Donbas) (Fisun 2015). Yanukovych was also very inconsistent in the use of repressions before and during
the  Euromaidan  crisis,  and  applied  violence  against  the  opposition  only  when  the  scope  of  protests
exceeded the technical capabilities of coercion, rather than relying upon the preemptive strategies of his
counterparts in Belarus and Russia. Judging by these preliminary comparisons, one might argue that
“success stories” of rebuilding state coercion in Belarus and Russia and the story of failure of state
coercion in Ukraine to a large degree should be attributed to agency-driven rather than structure-induced
factors: Lukashenko and Putin co-opted the followers and isolated the rivals of their political regimes,
thus extending “winning coalitions” (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2011), while Yanukovych did
exactly the opposite.
The same argument may be applied to evaluations of the authoritarian effects of numerous “legacies of
the past,” which are often perceived generally, but especially in Russia and Eurasia, as eternal barriers to
democracy and good governance (Hedlund 2005). There, the legacy of the past is loosely understood as
a set of historically established obstacles to democratization, which emerged before the Soviet collapse
for various reasons and has persisted for an indefinite period. However, this deterministic perception of
a “legacy” fails to explain why it has a different impact on different countries and policy areas, and how
exactly it affects post-Soviet institutions and practices. Instead of discussing arguments of path
dependency over and over again, one may pay more attention to the causal mechanisms of the translation
of legacies into the political and policy agenda for today and tomorrow. In search of alternatives to
determinism, Stephen Kotkin and Mark Beissinger redefined “legacy” as “a durable causal relationship
between  past  institutions  and  policies  on  subsequent  practices  or  beliefs,  long  beyond  the  life  of  the
regimes, institutions, and policies that gave birth to them” (Kotkin and Beissinger 2014, 7). They also
outline several causal mechanisms for transferring these institutions and practices from the past to the
present and the future, including material (“parameter-setting”), organizational and institutional
(“fragmentation” and “translation”), and ideational (“cultural schemata”). “Parameter-setting” relates to
the foreclosure of certain institutional and/or policy choices due to material constraints left over from the
past; “fragmentation” involves the direct inheritance of whole parts of previous institutions from the old
regime, while “translation” means using old institutions for new purposes; and “cultural schemata” refer
to perceptions generated by past regime practices that make certain forms of conduct either normal or
unacceptable (Kotkin and Beissinger 2014, 16).
Although this typology is useful, it is also worth mentioning that only one of these mechanisms, namely
parameter-setting, is essentially structural by nature—it results from certain limits set by the physical and
technological infrastructure inherited from the Soviet past, which posed major barriers to structural
reforms in the economy (Gaddy 2014). All other mechanisms of translation of legacies into the present-
day agenda, and their maintenance as cornerstones of authoritarianism in post-Soviet Eurasia are largely
agency-driven, in the manner of social constructs, which are created and maintained by ruling groups for
the sake of power maximization (Gel’man 2017). One might argue that various legacies of the past affect
the present and the future mostly because of the means by which they are transferred. The intentional use
of Soviet institutions and practices as a set of building blocks for post-Soviet institution-building and
mechanisms of governing states and regimes contributed to preservation of the authoritarian status quo
through fragmentation or translation of this social construct into major political choices and solutions.
Examples include the transformation of government structure after the Soviet collapse with regard to
performance of the state apparatus (Huskey 2014), and practices of control and monitoring in law
enforcement agencies (Taylor 2014), both of which extended the lives of outdated institutions and
organizations, thus contributing to a lack of political accountability and to the use (or abuse) of the state
agencies and coercive apparatus of post-Soviet states as instruments of political regimes and their leaders.
In this respect, “cultural schemata,” modes and patterns of thinking and perceiving reality, are especially
relevant for uncovering the agency-driven logic of post-Soviet authoritarian regime building. These
models and patterns were embedded in the past, but outlived it and gave birth to the new post-Soviet
normative ideal, which could be roughly labeled a “good Soviet Union” (Gel’man 2017), the basis for a
“mental model” (Denzau and North, 1994) for post-Soviet elites and societies.
In the case of ideational legacies, “history matters” as long as actors are able to use it purposively to
achieve their goals in various areas, including maintaining political regimes. The time horizon for these
reflections cannot be indefinitely long. In post-Soviet Eurasia, it is relevant to the recent life experience
of one or two generations, who, correctly or otherwise, interpreted the Soviet collapse and post-Soviet
political and economic changes as a major trauma and framed their perceptions of the late Soviet
experience as a paradise lost. When it comes to the mechanisms for bringing legacies into the current
agenda, material, organizational, and institutional legacies impose high costs on further regime changes
and contribute to the preservation of the political status quo. However, the scale of these costs may
decrease over time because of the emergence and spread of new institutions and practices not embedded
in the past. Meanwhile, ideational legacies define the understanding of the means and possible goals of
the process of institution-building, and serve as tools of ruling groups in this process.
In essence, the legacies of the past are largely a socially constructed phenomenon in post-Soviet Eurasia
and beyond, and should be regarded not as a structural constraint but as an agency-driven phenomenon.
With regard to political regimes, cultural schemata work as instruments for maintaining authoritarian
equilibrium because they establish a retrospective vector of public discussion, where the Soviet past is
considered as the main (if not only) “point of departure.” History is not only a subject for historians, but
penetrates all aspects of public life in the region. The imagined past experience has become a normative
marker in projecting the future of post-Soviet Eurasia, including political regimes. The “good Soviet
Union,” an imagined politico-economic order that somehow resembles that of the Soviet past while
lacking its inherent flaws, in reality bears little resemblance to the late Soviet experience. Elements of
the Soviet legacy are selectively and deliberately chosen for the sake of the power maximization of the
post-Soviet ruling groups. They include the hierarchy of the power vertical, “cadre stability” at all levels
of government (that  is,  low elite circulation),  a closed recruitment pool of elites and their  formal and
informal privileged status, state control over major media, state repressions toward organized dissent,
and so on. Meanwhile, other elements of the late Soviet politico-economic order, such as relatively low
inequality and certain state social guarantees, have been discarded without meaningful resistance. In
addition, the “good Soviet Union” includes certain features that did not exist in the real Soviet Union but
are very important for ruling groups: not only a fully fledged market economy and no shortages of goods
and services, but also a lack of institutional constraints on rent-seeking and the creation of an external
interface for legalization of incomes and status abroad (Cooley and Heathershaw, 2017). The assertion
that the “good Soviet Union” is a deliberate construction by post-Soviet ruling groups and their
entourages is no wild exaggeration: in the 2000s, against the background of post-transformation
economic growth, they acquired that which they wanted but which had been unavailable to their late
Soviet predecessors, and their efforts to preserve this normative ideal have borne fruit in many ways. As
a result, the “good Soviet Union” has not produced incentives to overcome authoritarianism but has
become a successful instrument for the legitimation of the political status quo at least in the medium-
term perspective, until the current generation of post-Soviet rulers and citizens leave the public scene
(Gel’man 2017).
Last but not least, political identity and its mobilization for the overthrow of post-Soviet authoritarian
regimes (Way 2015) as well as for their preservation (Rogov 2015) is a by-product of a social
construction to an even larger degree than the normative ideal of a “good Soviet Union.” Its political uses
may be considered as by-products of intra-elite struggles, and the zero-sum resolution of these conflicts
leaves little room for alternative anti-regime identities: they either become co-opted into regime-led
“winning coalitions” or are successfully marginalized. Russia may serve as an example of both outcomes.
On the one hand, ethnic and regional identities that had been successfully politically mobilized in the
1990s by subnational elites (Gorenburg 2003) in the 2000s lost their salience because of the political
weakening of these elites and their integration into the power vertical (Goode 2011). On the other, the
potential of the civic and cultural identities that became so visible during the wave of mass protests in
2011–2012 has been diminished in the wake of regime-initiated campaigns of “cultural wars” (Smyth
and Soboleva 2014; Robinson 2017). At the same time, where such struggles have non–zero-sum
outcomes, foreign policy identities can be effectively mobilized, as the experiences of Ukraine and
Moldova suggest (Way 2015). Again, this phenomenon can be considered not as a cause of political
regime dynamics but rather as its effect, both in post-Soviet Eurasia and elsewhere.
To summarize, bringing actors back into the analysis of post-Soviet regime dynamics has not only
challenged the emphasis on the role of non-economic structural factors in explaining these trajectories
but in a way provided a completely different picture. State coercion, legacies, and identities are driven to
a large degree by the interests and choices of power-maximizing political actors, and the outcomes of
their conflicts often matter more than these factors themselves. The shift in research focus may help to
explain why in some countries these factors are important for their political regime dynamics whereas in
others they are not. These considerations are also relevant to establishing the next research task.
In search of a new dynamic model
The other feature of the dismal consensus among scholars of post-Soviet Eurasia is its implicit
assumption  of  the  persistence  of  current  political  regimes  for  an  indefinitely  long  period.  For  the
“pluralism by default” model, the main expectation is the continuity of “muddling through” without
serious progress toward sustainable democracy or sustainable authoritarianism, while the “Lord of the
Flies” model implies that an autocrat who has seized and usurped power will remain invincible until his
death. While this assumption may be correct in factual terms, it has left little room for analysis of sources
of further political regime changes, to some extent resembling the failures of Sovietologists during the
period of dismal consensus in the 1970s.
At first sight, the structural factors of the present day offer low odds of democratization in post-Soviet
Eurasia and beyond. The international environment currently looks rather unfavorable for the prevention
of autocracy (let alone permission of democracy), similar to the age of the 1970s dismal consensus. One
might further compare the consequences of the financial crisis of 2008–2009 for Europe with the
somewhat similar effects of the 1970s stagflation in the West. In that light, it is no wonder that in the
eyes of many politicians, democracy means instability if not chaos, and with the authoritarian drift of
numerous countries ranging from Hungary to Turkey, democracy looks even less appealing. The
prospects for sustainable economic growth in Russia and certain other post-Soviet countries are dubious
at best, especially after the end of the oil boom of the 2000s. But will these conditions be long lasting,
and how might they affect the preservation of the political status quo? At the same time, the inevitable
aging of the political leaders in post-Soviet personalist authoritarian regimes may increase risks of
disequilibrium. These risks are fueled by the low chances for hereditary leadership succession in these
regimes (Brownlee 2007),5 and the success story of the dynastic rule of the Aliyev family (Hale 2015)
may remain exceptional in post-Soviet Eurasia. Furthermore, the inevitable process of generational
change among the mass public is likely to increase these risks due to the rising demands for alternatives
to the political status quo among the Russian youth, and the major disconnect between their way of life
and that of their grandparents’ generation, who tend to rule the country without using the Internet, and
perceive it as a source of political threats (Soldatov and Borogan 2015). In addition, the attractiveness of
the “good Soviet Union” as a retrospective normative ideal for Russia and Eurasia will decrease over
time despite propaganda efforts.
In fact, the “Lord of the Flies” model could transform into a new edition of The Autumn of the Patriarch,
increasing the risks of disequilibrium very similarly to the personalist rule of an aging dictator so
brilliantly described by Gabriel Garcia Marquez. In particular, in Russia the features of the political
trajectory that became visible after the annexation of Crimea—the rejection of economic modernization
and the abandonment of the very goal of growth and development, a reactionary domestic agenda based
on “the politics of fear” (Gel’man 2016) and “cultural wars” (Robinson 2017), and desperate attempts to
restore Russia’s status as one of the global “oligarchs” in foreign policy at any cost—are likely to persist
over time as Putin’s rule continues. Not only may domestic and international perceptions of the aging
leadership as a threat increase over time, but the previous experience of regime survival after aggressive
responses to earlier threats (Davenport 1995) may also contribute to the temptation to use the same
political tools repeatedly, often in an unpredictable and self-destructive manner.
Disequilibrium of authoritarian regimes, however, does not necessarily result in democratization, as
about 70% of cases of authoritarian breakdowns after World War II led to the replacement of one form
of authoritarianism by another (Geddes, Wright, and Franz 2014). The countries of post-Soviet Eurasia
may follow this path if new elite conflicts are resolved in a zero-sum manner, thus repeating the same
“Lord of the Flies” scenario. However, one should take into account the original context of the 1990s,
when the zero-sum resolutions of intra-elite conflicts in Russia, Belarus, or Azerbaijan were deeply
affected by the numerous consequences of the Soviet collapse, such as the decline of law and order,
ethnic conflicts, and the deep and protracted transformation recession in the economy. In a sense, the rise
of certain post-Soviet authoritarian regimes was a side effect of the failed attempts at the democratization
of the Soviet Union under Mikhail Gorbachev and later of Russia under Yel’tsin (Gel’man 2015).
However, it is highly unlikely that similar combinations of factors will occur simultaneously in several
countries of the region decades later, and thus contribute to a second fall into the same trap.
Scholars lack a magic bullet for the invention of a new comprehensive explanatory actor-centered
dynamic model of political regime changes in post-Soviet Eurasia and beyond, let alone for building its
predictive capacity. Some of the hints already gained, however, will be useful. The first and foremost of
these  is  the  major  shift  from normative  to  positive  lenses  of  analysis  of  political  regimes,  which  will
enable scholarship to overcome the Manichean dichotomy of “democracy versus authoritarianism” and
avoid both Hollywood movie and film noir thinking about politics in post-Soviet Eurasia and elsewhere.
Politicians  cannot  be  defined  as  either  “good  guys”  or  “bad  guys,”  but  rather  as  self-interested
opportunists who seek power maximization and make certain choices in order to achieve their goals. In
given circumstances, they may opt for democracy or authoritarianism, but not because they are strongly
committed to either of these regimes in ideational terms (as has often been assumed by scholars since the
times of the “Transitions” project)6 but because of their expectations of the costs and benefits of their
choices.  Moreover,  some  post-Soviet  politicians  may  change  sides  over  time  and  contribute  both  to
authoritarian regime-building and to its demise. Petro Poroshenko in Ukraine might be a prime example
of such behavior. He was (and still is) a wealthy oligarch, and he joined the “winning coalition” around
Viktor Yushchenko before the Orange Revolution of 2004, then switched sides and served as a minister
during the reign of Yanukovych, but in 2013–2014 became the main sponsor of the Euromaidan protests
and, in the end, their major beneficiary, being elected as Ukrainian president in May 2014. No wonder
that Poroshenko as a president has little incentive to pursue much-needed political and policy reforms in
Ukraine (Hale and Orttung, 2016), which may hurt his political and business interests. Blaming
politicians for such inconsistent behaviour is similar to blaming dolphins for eating fish.
The shift from normative to positive lenses of analysis is also useful in practical terms for balancing the
research focus. While some analysts considered the recent waves of regime changes in post-communist
countries to be successes of a pro-democratic and pro-Western opposition (Bunce and Wolchik 2011),
their  critics  noted  that  these  developments  resulted  from the  failure  of  their  authoritarian  rivals  (Way
2015). However, these discussions of “who is to blame” for the survival or collapse of authoritarianism—
the regime or the opposition—have paid little attention to the strategic interactions between and within
these two groups of actors as players of the same (repeating) game of political regime dynamics. Doing
so would diminish the risk of disillusionment among scholars and experts regarding certain unfulfilled
promises of democratic breakthroughs, especially in cases of “pluralism by default.” It must be said that
the failure of authoritarian drift (as in Ukraine under Yanukovych) has not led to democracy by default.
This is not only because “democracy is a system where parties lose elections” (Przeworski 1991, 10) and
politicians tend to use various tricks to avoid power shifts by electoral means; the experience of post-
Soviet Russia is telling in this respect (Gel’man 2015; Golosov 2017). It is also because the development
of democracy becomes irreversible only if it provides conditions for a major turnover of ruling elites,
rather than their cartel-like agreements on the partial reshuffling of “winning coalitions,” as in Ukraine
or Moldova (Hale 2015). As Neil Abrams and M. Steven Fish convincingly demonstrated in their analysis
of the success story in Estonia, these conditions became the key for that country’s advancement (Abrams
and Fish 2015). Still, most post-Soviet political actors lack incentives for building democracy and this is
why in cases of “pluralism by default” they may at best prevent authoritarianism: under these conditions,
in Olson’s terms, democracy is “permitted,” but not necessarily practiced. Moreover, the recent
experience of the undermining of democratic practices in certain post-communist countries of Eastern
Europe, such as Hungary (Magyar 2016), has only reinforced these caveats.
Taking a positive research perspective (instead of the normative one) may also help to diminish risks of
excessive hopes for democratic potential to overthrow autocrats and, more importantly, of excessive
demonization of authoritarian leaders. This is especially true in the case of Putin, often portrayed by
scholars and analysts as an omnipotent and invincible super-powerful actor that resembles characters
from spy movies if not crime novels (Dawisha 2014; Hill and Gaddy 2013). Of course, one should
definitely not underestimate the political effects of authoritarian learning in post-Soviet Eurasia (Hall
and Ambrosio 2017; Golosov 2017), nor the capabilities and skills of autocrats elsewhere across the
globe (Bueno de Mesquita and Smith 2011). Yet authoritarian leaders are vulnerable to numerous
strategic miscalculations and tactical errors despite (or perhaps because of) the greater degree of freedom
in their choices and tactics vis-à-vis their democratic counterparts. The sad experience of Yanukovych,
who ruined his “winning coalition” before and during the Euromaidan protests (Kudelia 2014),
demonstrates a chain of fatal errors made by a ruler who faced unexpected challenges and failed to
respond appropriately. In a broader sense, information problems, which are typical for many authoritarian
regimes (Svolik 2012), may increase this vulnerability under conditions of disequilibrium: the unintended
consequences of moves made by political actors may make those moves self-destructive.
The problem for scholars of political regime dynamics in post-Soviet Eurasia and beyond is not only
their own limited predictive capacity in a changing environment but also the very long list of unknown
variables that may be crucial for understanding regime trajectories. This list includes, among others, the
readiness of post-Soviet authoritarian regimes, where they perceive threats to their survival, to employ
large-scale political violence as a primary tool of dominance, instead of relying upon small-scale
preemptive repressions domestically (Silitski 2015; Gel’man 2016) and “proxy wars” internationally.
Another very important and yet unknown variable is the dynamics of mass political support, which may
change dramatically if alternatives to the political status quo are perceived as viable. The observed high
degree of support for political leaders, even if it is genuinely representative in non-competitive conditions
(Frye et al. 2017), may decline under conditions where real political choices are available. In addition,
the degree of governability of post-Soviet states, notorious for their practices of bad governance
(Gel’man 2017) is also unknown: scholars and experts do not know how these states may respond to
possible exogenous shocks of various kinds, or how these responses may or may not affect political
regime dynamics.
This long list of unknown variables makes analyzing the rationale of political changes (let alone their
prediction) highly problematic, especially in cases of falling autocrats, as in Ukraine in 2014. However,
understanding the limits and boundaries of scholarly knowledge is a necessary step toward breaking the
dismal consensus and instead searching for new models of political regime dynamics. This shift in
conceptual frames will help analysts of post-Soviet Eurasia to “think possibilistically, not
probabilistically,” as Philippe Schmitter summarized it in the context of the “Transitions” project (Munck
and Snyder 2007, 324). Indeed, the logic of political changes, especially under an autocracy, is highly
non-linear, as the experience of the collapse of many authoritarian regimes suggests. Tipping points often
occur not only due to sudden shifts in public opinion, when alternatives to dictatorships emerge (Kuran
1991), but also due to changes in coalition dynamics among the elites (Svolik 2012). The possibilistic
shift in thinking about politics may also offer some sort of bias for hope to those scholars who still believe
in democracy and democratization in the region and beyond despite all the anti-democratic challenges
and temptations around the globe. This is why the main slogan of the Russian opposition rallies—“Russia
Will  Be Free!”—may be perceived not just  as a call  for action but also as a key item on the political
agenda in the not so distant future.
Acknowledgements
A previous version of this paper was presented at the conference “Critical Issues in the Research of Contemporary
Russian Politics” (University of Helsinki, June 2017). I would like to thank Oleksandr Fisun, Timothy Frye, Henry
Hale, and Kirill Rogov for their very useful comments on earlier versions of the text.
Funding
This article is part of the Center of Excellence “Choices of Russian Modernization,” funded by the
Academy of Finland (grant No.284664).
Notes
1. This parallel was first drawn by Samuel Huntington (1965, 416)
2. To some extent, the case of Kyrgyzstan is also close to the “pluralism by default” trajectory
(Radnitz 2012).
3. O’Donnell himself, with his earlier concept of “bureaucratic authoritarianism” in Latin America
(O’Donnell 1973), might be a prime example of a scholar working from such a perspective; the
same is true for Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Adam Przeworski, Philippe Schmitter, and Alfred
Stepan; the “Transitions” project become a refocusing rather than a rejection of the previous
research agenda.
4. The slogan “know your enemy,” a major driver of Soviet studies during the Cold War (Engerman,
2009), has not lost its relevance.
5. The post-Soviet elites’ strong awareness of these prospects provides them with strong incentives
to behave as “roving bandits” (Olson 1993) and greatly contributes to various instances of bad
governance (Cooley and Heathershaw 2017; Gel’man 2017).
6. Ideational factors played a comparatively negligible role in post-Soviet politics (Hanson 2010;
Hale 2015)—most probably because of the political learning effect after the failure of Gorbachev,
who was a true believer in the renewal of socialism.
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